This paper examines the competitiveness of industries in six Asian countries-China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan-using the World Input-Output Database tables from 1995 to 2011. Competitiveness is measured by the value-added that industries contribute to the production of final goods, which we refer to as global value chain (GVC) income, rather than by gross exports. We find that, unlike EU countries, Asian countries have generally been able to combine increasing GVC job opportunities with a rise in real income. The GVC income in Asian countries presents a different picture to that in European countries.
Introduction
The international competitiveness of industries has long been one of the central issues in the literature on business (e.g., Porter 1990) and economics (e.g., Fagerberg 1988) . Traditionally, shares in the world export markets are used to measure the competitiveness of industries. However, as a result of increases in the intermediate inputs trade, "the conventional indicators of competitiveness based on gross exports become less informative" (Timmer et al. 2013, 613) . This is because a large export share does not necessarily mean that an industry has a large value-added if its main production process consists of simple assembly activities, based on imported intermediate inputs.
A typical example to illustrate this is Chinese exports of the Apple iPod. Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2009) focused on the production process of the iPod and examined the distribution of profits across firms that supplied intermediate inputs and other related services. They found that, although the iPod was designed by Apple in the United States and assembled by Inventec Appliances in China, its intermediate goods came from various firms in various countries. As a result, the value-added (measured by the operating margin) was distributed across these firms in different countries. Lead firm Apple in the United States earned 11.8 percent of the operating margin. The remaining margins were shared by such firms as Samsung in South Korea, which provided primary memory (9.4 percent of the operating margin), TDK in Japan, which provided the battery (7.6 percent), Toshiba-Matsushita Display in Japan, which provided the display panel (3.9 percent), and Toshiba in Japan, which provided the hard drive (3.8 percent). In China, in contrast, the value-added was very low even though the iPod was assembled there.
1 This clearly indicates that the iPod being exported from China does not necessarily mean that all the valueadded of the iPod is distributed to Chinese factory owners.
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In light of the increasing importance of the intermediate inputs trade in Asia, in this paper we examine the competitiveness of industries in selected Asian countries. In order to measure the competitiveness of the industries, we focus on how much value-added they could earn. To do so, we use the concept of global value chain (GVC) income, which was proposed by Timmer et al. (2013) . GVC income is defined as the value-added that industries contribute to the production of final manufacturing goods. Unlike value-added exports, GVC income takes into account the value-added that is generated from domestic final demand as well as foreign final demand. 3 As we will discuss, developed countries are facing declining domestic demand, whereas emerging countries are facing increasing domestic demand. If such differences are not taken into account, one could overestimate the competitiveness of industries in developed countries and/or underestimate the competitiveness of industries in emerging countries. We also examine the employment involved in the production of final manufacturing goods, which we refer to as GVC workers, to examine the changes in demand for skills in the Asian countries on which we focus. 4 Note that the definition of competitiveness in this paper is similar to but slightly different from the definition used in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Bernard et al. (2003) . In these studies, the competitiveness of a country is measured by the country's technology state, adjusted for its labor costs. This is, so to speak, an ex ante measure, in the sense that the actual value-added that a country can earn depends upon its trade costs. Even if a country is competitive, it may earn a small value-added, owing to its remoteness from the market. In contrast, we use an ex post measure, in the sense that we focus on how much value-added the industries in a country could actually earn.
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Our study relates to two strands of the existing literature. One comprises the studies on the value-added trade in Asian countries. 6 For example, Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) examined the value-added exports of several countries, including Asian countries, in 2004. One of the interesting findings of their study is that both China and India exhibited a strong revealed comparative advantage (RCA) if RCA was based on gross exports. The RCA ranking of both countries fell dramatically, however, if RCA was based on the exports of domestic value-added. Similar results were found by Ceglowski (2015) , who examined the competitiveness of 56 countries in five industries, using a trade in value-added (TiVA) database developed by the OECD and the World Trade Organization.
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The other strand of the literature to which our study relates comprises the studies on the competitiveness of industries, where competitiveness is measured by GVC income rather than value-added exports. A pioneering study is Timmer et al. (2013 Grodzicki (2014) applied the concept of GVC income to examine the competitiveness of the Visegrad Four economies (i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). Timmer et al. (2015) applied this framework to analyze the shifts in competitiveness in automotive production across countries.
These two strands of studies have made significant contributions to the economics and business literature. Nevertheless, the first strand of studies did not take into account the effect of domestic final demand or the effects on employment, and the second strand focuses only on European countries or only on a particular sector. 9 Note that Asian countries may present a different picture from the European countries. For example, Kimura (2006) argued that the development of cross-border production-sharing is more advanced in East Asia than in North America and Europe. 10 Similarly, Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) pointed out that "Factory Asia" is more like a network and much less like the huband-spoke pattern that is observed in "Factory North America" and "Factory Europe." This is because the processing of manufacturing products often involves stops in multiple nations. It is therefore interesting to ask whether there are patterns in GVC income and GVC workers in Asia similar to those found in Europe. A detailed analysis of the competitiveness of industries in Asian countries is needed to better inform the policy debates on globalization.
Given this background, in this paper we attempt to fill the gap between these two strands of literature. We examine the competitiveness of industries in six Asian countries: China, 9 In this connection, and Kwon and Ryou (2015) examined the value-added trade, using the WIOD. Their main objectives were to propose an approach to decompose the value-added content of trade into the foreign and domestic content, when intermediate inputs are traded , and to develop a new index of vertical specialization (Kwon and Ryou 2015) . The scope of their studies is different from the studies on GVC income. Foster-McGregor, Stehrer, and de Vries (2013) examined skill demand using the WIOD. Their sample consisted of 40 countries, including Asian countries. As noted, however, they focused on the determinants of skill demand and, although they examined offshoring, GVC income is beyond the scope of their study.
India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Following the methodology developed by Timmer et al. (2013) , we measure the competitiveness of industries using GVC income. To compute GVC income, we utilize the latest version of the WIOD, which covers the period between 1995 and 2011. 11 This framework enables us to trace the source of the value-added for the six Asian countries. Moreover, it allows us to examine the effects of changes in the production of final manufacturing goods on skill demand. Thus, our study contributes to both strands of literature, takes into account the effect of domestic final demand and the effects on employment, and adds another regional perspective to the available evidence.
The major findings of this paper are two-fold. First, the competitiveness of manufacturing is increasing in China, India, and Indonesia, whereas it is decreasing in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Even though we focus on GVC income rather than gross exports, the increasing competitiveness of Chinese, Indian, and Indonesian manufacturing is remarkable. Second, unlike the EU countries, Asian countries have generally been able to combine an increase in GVC job opportunities with a rise in real income. The correlation between the change in real income per worker and the change in the number of workers is 0.55 for the six Asian countries studied, whereas it is −0.26 for the EU27 countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology and data used in this paper. In Section 3, we present the estimation results. A summary and concluding remarks are presented in Section 4. This enables us to trace the gross output in all stages of production that is needed to produce one unit of final demand in each industry in each country. Once we trace the gross output flows needed to produce one unit of final demand, we can derive the value-added that is involved in the production of final manufacturing goods by multiplying these gross output flows with the share of the value-added to the gross output for each industry in each country. By the same logic, one can trace the number of workers that are directly and indirectly involved in the production of one unit of final demand. We extend this idea to measure how much value-added and employment are involved in the production of final manufactured goods, to measure the GVC income and GVC workers, respectively.
GVC income
The key differences between GVC income and gross exports are twofold. First, the GVC income focuses on the value-added transactions. Like the value-added trade, therefore, GVC income excludes intermediate inputs, whereas the gross exports measure includes them. Second, unlike the value-added trade, GVC income includes value-added in the production of domestic as well as final demand. This is to capture the net effects on domestic and foreign demand because income can be generated from both domestic and foreign final demand. If a country has a large domestic market, measures based on gross exports (or foreign final demand) miss the effects of the domestic market. In other words, gross exports (and foreign demand) allow us to measure shares in the world export markets excluding the domestic market, whereas GVC income allows us to measure the shares in world markets including the domestic market.
Note that, conceptually, GVC income can cover not only final manufactured goods but also final non-manufactured goods, including services. As Timmer et al. (2013) pointed out, however, the WIOD is not detailed enough to examine actively traded services. For example, consultancy services are one of the services actively traded across borders but they are included in business services in the WIOD. Because most business services are nontradables, it is difficult to capture precisely the trade in consultancy services. As a compromise, therefore, in this paper we focus on GVC income generated by the demand for final manufactured goods. In this paper, therefore, the GVC income means the manufacturing GVC income.
Methodology
Following the methodology of Timmer et al. (2013), we calculate GVC income for six Asian countries: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. We also compute GVC income for Germany and the United States as reference points. This section provides the mathematical exposition of the methodology, which follows a standard global IO analysis approach, as in Timmer et al. (2013) .
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Suppose that there are M production factors and S industries in N countries. Although we will apply annual data in our empirical analysis, time subscripts are left out for ease of exposition. Output in each country-industry is produced using domestic production factors and intermediate inputs, which are sourced domestically or from abroad. Output is used to satisfy final demand (either at home or abroad) or is used as an intermediate input in production (either at home or abroad as well).
To trace the transactions of intermediate and final goods, it is necessary to define source and destination country-industries. 14 For a particular good, let i be the source country, let j be the destination country, let s be the source industry, and t be the destination industry. Let y i (s) be the value of the output of industry s of country i, let f i j (s) be the value of the output exported from industry s in country i for final use in any country j and let x i j (s, t) be the value of the output exported from industry s in country i for intermediate use by
, goods are used at home (abroad). The goods marketclearing condition is written as:
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 presents the structure of the global IO table for a threecountry case (i.e., N = 3), where v j (t) indicates the value-added of industry t in country j.
As Figure 1 shows, the global IO (s, t) ) and by country 3 (x 13 (s, t)). Country 1's output also goes to final use in the domestic market ( f 11 (s)) and to final use by country 2 ( f 12 (s)) and by country 3 ( f 13 (s)). Similarly, imports (for final use) by country 1 are captured by f 21 (s) and f 31 (s).
Let y be the vector of production of dimension (SN × 1), which is obtained by stacking output levels y i (s) in each country-industry. We define f as the vector of dimension (SN × 1) that is constructed by stacking world final demand for output by each country-industry
Figure 1. Two-country global input-output table
Source: Kiyota (2016) .
Note: yi(s) is the value of output in industry s of country i; fij(s) is the value of output exported from industry s in country i for the final use in any country j; xij(s,t) is the value of output exported from industry s in country i to the intermediate use by industry t in country j; vj(t)
indicates the value added of industry t in country j. For more detail about the notations, see main text.
The elements represent the output from industry s in country i used as an intermediate input by industry t in country j as a share of country j's output in industry t. Therefore, the matrix A describes how each of the country-industry goods are produced, using a combination of domestic and foreign intermediate inputs.
Equation (1) is rewritten as y = Ay + f. Rearranging this, the following fundamental IO identity is obtained:
where I is an identity matrix of dimensions (SN × SN) and (I − A) −1 is the so-called Leontief inverse (Leontief 1936) . In this matrix, an element in row s and column t represents the total value of production by industry s that is required to produce one unit of final output in industry t.
Note that, given that (I − A) −1 is the Leontief inverse, which characterizes intermediate input transactions between industries across countries, equation (2) captures all the direct and indirect effects because it accounts for the domestic vertical linkages between industries within a country (i.e., j = i) and the international vertical linkages between countries (i.e., j = i).
Let p i (s) be the value-added per gross output produced by industry s in country i. Letp be a diagonal matrix of dimensions (SN × SN), the elements of which are p i (s), where the hat designates that it is a diagonal matrix. The GVC income is the value-added that is involved in manufacturing the final demand of the industries, both directly and indirectly. Let the vector of the GVC income of dimensions (SN × 1) be v, the elements of which are the valueadded produced by industry s in country i, v i (s).
Note that we focus on the manufacturing GVC. Let the vector of the manufacturing final demand ( (2), GVC income (i.e., the manufacturing GVC income) can be rewritten as:
Similarly, let L i (s) be the number of workers in industry s in country i and let l i (s) be the labor-input coefficient, where
Let n denote a vector of dimensions (SN × 1), the elements of which are L i (s), and letL denote a diagonal matrix of dimensions (SN × SN), the elements of which are l i (s). The GVC workers are the workers who contribute to producing the final demand of the industries both directly and indirectly. From equation (2), GVC workers are written as:
Equations (3) and (4) are used to measure GVC income and GVC workers, respectively.
Data
This paper utilizes WIOD data for the period from 1995 to 2011. 15 The WIOD is built on national accounts data that were developed within the Seventh Framework Program of the European Commission. The WIOD provides time-series information on the global IO tables for the EU27 countries, 13 other major countries, and the rest of the world (ROW). The 13 countries include non-EU OECD member countries, including Japan and the United States, and emerging economies, including China, Indonesia, and Mexico. 16 These tables are constructed on the basis of officially published IO tables, in conjunction with national accounts and international trade statistics. The simplified structure of the world IO table is presented in Figure 2 , which has the same structure as An advantage of the WIOD is that it provides socioeconomic accounts, which include annual data on employment at the industry level. 17 This enables us to examine more precisely the effects of exports on employment. Moreover, throughout the data collection effort, harmonization procedures were applied to ensure international comparability of the data. This ensures data quality and enables us to conduct comparative analysis at the industry and national levels. Table 1 shows GVC income for the six Asian countries. 19 The GVC incomes of Germany and the United States are also reported for reference. The sixth and seventh columns in Table 1 report the share of GVC income resulting from domestic and foreign demand, where the GVC income resulting from foreign demand is identical to what Johnson and Noguera (2012) referred to as value-added exports. The last three columns report the ratio 18 One may ask whether this method is superior to imputation (e.g., estimating the missing category as a residual or, alternatively, assuming that the contribution of this element is similar for similar countries). Note, however, that the imputation of missing values in IO tables will break the balance in the sum of rows and that of columns. Therefore, imputation is not applicable. Another problem with the WIOD data is that there may be exports to the ROW that take negative values (e.g., Mining and Quarrying in South Korea in 2009). This is because the exports to the ROW are defined as the residual of the total exports minus exports summed over the set of WIOD countries in the national supply and use tables. We use the negative values as they are stated.
Results

Competitiveness of the selected Asian countries
19 Note that, although we present results for six Asian countries, Germany, and the United States, our analysis utilized data for all 41 countries (including the ROW) in the WIOD. That is, matrices and vectors such as (I − A) −1 and f m include the 41 countries in the WIOD. 
Note: The figure shows the shares of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate inputs in manufacturing industries in 1995 and in 2011.
of real manufacturing GVC income in 2011 to that in 1995, based on total, domestic, and foreign demand, respectively.
We highlight four results. First, the share of world manufacturing GVC income for developed countries declined rapidly between 1995 and 2011. The share of GVC income for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, and the United States declined between 1995 and 2011. In particular, the decline of Japanese GVC income is notable, as it fell from 16.9 percent of the world total in 1995 to 7.3 percent in 2011. A recent study by Suganuma (2016), using the WIOD, found that the "upstreamness" of industries, which is defined as the average distance from the final use in terms of the production stages that a particular good 
Note: Real manufacturing GVC income is manufacturing GVC income in constant 1995 prices (deflated by the US CPI). The last two columns show the share of real manufactures GVC income due to domestic and foreign demand in total manufacturing GVC income in the economy.
goes through, increased in Japan from 1995 to 2011. Our results suggest that, despite Japan increasing the "upstreamness" of its industries, it nevertheless lost manufacturing GVC income rapidly.
Second, in contrast to the developed countries, the share of the emerging economies expanded rapidly. In particular, Chinese GVC income grew from 4.1 percent of the world total in 1995 to 16.2 percent in 2011. It is notable that the share of Chinese GVC income in 2011 (16.2 percent) exceeded that of Japanese GVC income (7.3 percent). Similarly, the share of Indian GVC income in 2011 (3.4 percent) exceeded that of South Korean GVC income (2.1 percent). These findings confirm the growing importance of the emerging economies in GVC income. Even though we focus on GVC income rather than gross exports, the increasing competitiveness of Chinese, Indian, and Indonesian manufacturing is remarkable.
Third, the share of the GVC income resulting from foreign demand increased between 1995 and 2011 for all countries included in Table 1 . In particular, in South Korea and Taiwan, the share of GVC income resulting from foreign demand accounted for more than twothirds of these countries' total GVC income (67.7 percent in South Korea and 80.7 percent in Taiwan).
Finally, in the developed countries, GVC manufacturing income resulting from domestic demand declined from 1995 to 2011. For example, in Japan, GVC income resulting from domestic demand in 2011 was 63 percent of the 1995 level. These results suggest that the increasing importance of foreign demand is common to both the developed countries and the Asian emerging countries. Note that the IO accounting framework is a linear system of equations. As noted by Timmer et al. (2013), we can decompose the changes in the GVC manufacturing income into the changes in production structures and those in final demand. Let B ≡ (I − A) −1 . Then,
, where the upper bar indicates the period average. 20 This decomposition enables us to investigate more explicitly the contribution of changes in the production structure and in final demand to the changes in GVC income. Table 2 presents the decomposition results. Two findings stand out from this table. First, when the production structures are kept constant, all countries, except for Japan, show positive change in GVC income. This is the result of growing final demand, especially in the emerging economies. For Japan, the decline in domestic final demand was so rapid (Table 1 ) that the positive effect of foreign final demand could not offset the negative effect of the decline in domestic final demand.
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Second, when final demand is kept constant, China, India, and Indonesia show positive changes in GVC income, whereas Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan show negative changes, as do Germany and the United States. These results imply that not only the changes in final demand but also changes in the production structure have contributed to the growth of GVC manufacturing income in China, India, and Indonesia. Table 3 presents the growth of real exports and of real GVC income. One of the notable results is the difference between these growth rates. In all eight countries, the growth of GVC income was smaller than that of exports, implying that the growth of trade in intermediate inputs was very rapid. 22 Another notable result is the large negative growth of the Japanese GVC income. Whereas Japanese exports grew 19.2 percent, the growth rate of GVC income was −36.6 percent. Similar results are observed in Taiwan, which shows positive export growth and slightly negative GVC income growth. These results clearly suggest that the growth of exports does not necessarily mean growth of value-added. Owing to increasing international transactions of intermediate inputs, the growth of exports could overestimate that of value-added.
Sectoral differences
Some of the services can be traded not only directly but also indirectly (i.e., through the manufactured products). For example, Kiyota (2005) examined the services content of Japanese trade between 1985 and 1995, using a detailed IO table for Japan, and found that 84.3 percent of research and development (R&D) services exports occurred through machinery exports. In addition, the R&D services content of Japanese machinery exports to East and Southeast Asia grew rapidly over this period. Similarly, a recent study by Francois, Manchin, and Tomberger (2015) emphasized the increasing importance of services inputs in value-added exports. Therefore, it is interesting to examine GVC income by industry, as well as by the skill type of workers (as in this section). Table 4 presents the sectoral decomposition of real GVC income in 1995 and 2011. The sixth column and the last column in Table 4 correspond to the second columns in Tables 1 and  3 , respectively. Note that real GVC income is computed from equation (3). GVC income, which is generated from the manufacturing final demand, can be ultimately distributed to each sector in each country. The sectoral decomposition indicates how much GVC income is obtained by each sector.
We highlight three results. First, in terms of industry levels as a proportion of GVC income, the share of agriculture remains relatively large in China, India, and Indonesia in 2011, exceeding 10 percent, whereas it is less than 5 percent in the other countries examined. In China, India, and Indonesia, agriculture remains an important source of GVC income. Second, in terms of changes in GVC income from 1995 to 2011, China, India, and Indonesia show positive figures in all sectors, whereas Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan show different patterns. In South Korea, real manufacturing GVC income decreased in agriculture, whereas it increased in manufacturing and services. In Taiwan, it decreased in agriculture and manufacturing, but increased in services. In Japan, real manufacturing GVC income decreased in all sectors. The results indicate the heterogeneity of the changes in the GVC income across Asian countries. Finally, the increases in real GVC income in services either exceeded (or were very close to) the changes in agriculture and manufacturing in India, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Germany. This result indicates the increasing importance of services in manufacturing GVC, which is consistent with the finding of Francois, Manchin and Tomberger (2015) . Table 5 presents GVC workers in 1995 and 2011 by sector, corresponding to GVC income results reported in Table 3 . One important finding is that the changes in the sectoral employment structure vary across countries. Although Timmer et al. (2013) found that GVC workers shifted from manufacturing to service activities in many EU countries, for the six Asian countries that we study, this pattern occurs only for South Korea. China, India, Indonesia, and Taiwan shifted their employment activities from agriculture to the manufacturing and service sectors. In Japan, employment activities declined in all sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, and service), which is a pattern also observed in the United States. These results together suggest that the shifts in employment activities vary across the Asian countries and differ greatly between Asian and European countries. Timmer et al. (2013) found that, in the EU27 countries, there were increases in high-skilled and medium-skilled workers and decreases in low-skilled workers when examining manufacturing GVC workers. However, this pattern is not necessarily repeated in the six Asian countries. Table 6 presents the growth of GVC workers by skill level. In the WIOD, skill level is defined by the level of educational attainment as in the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED): low-skilled (ISCED categories 1 and 2), medium-skilled (ISCED 3 and 4) and high-skilled (ISCED 5 and 6). 23 Table 6 indicates that GVC workers declined for all types of skills in Japan, and this pattern is also observed in the United States. In contrast, GVC workers increased for all types of skills in China and India. These results imply that, in China and India, even low-skilled workers can benefit from growth in the production of final manufacturing goods.
Skill structure of GVC workers
Timmer et al. (2013) found a negative correlation between jobs and real wage increases in the largest 19 EU countries, suggesting that "only a few countries have been able to combine increasing GVC job opportunities with a substantial rise in real wages" (648). Figure 4 presents the change in real income per worker and the change in the number of workers between 1995 and 2009 for countries in the WIOD for which we have consumer price index data (33 countries). 24 The real income per worker is defined as the average labor income per worker in manufacturing GVC, deflated by the national consumer price index.
Figure 4 seems to show that there is no correlation between the change in real income per worker and the change in the number of workers. Indeed, the correlation between them is 0.06, implying that there is no systematic relationship. If we focus on the six Asian countries (i.e., China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), however, we can confirm a strong positive relationship. The correlation between the change in real income per worker and the change in the number of workers becomes 0.55 for the six Asian 23 ISCED are defined as follows: category 1 = primary education; category 2 = lower-secondary education; category 3 = upper-secondary education; category 4 = post-secondary, non-tertiary education; category 5 = short-cycle tertiary education; category 6 = a bachelors degree or equivalent level. value-added that industries contribute to the production of final manufactured goods. Unlike value-added exports, GVC income takes into account the value-added generated from domestic final demand as well as foreign final demand. To compute GVC income, we utilized world IO tables, covering the period 1995 to 2011.
The major findings of this paper are two-fold. First, the competitiveness of manufacturing has declined in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and it has increased in China, India, and Indonesia. Even though we focus on GVC income rather than gross exports, the increasing competitiveness of Chinese, Indian, and Indonesian manufacturing is remarkable. Second, unlike the EU countries, the Asian countries have generally been able to combine increasing GVC job opportunities with rises in real income. The correlation between the change in the real income per worker and the change in the number of workers is 0.55 for the six Asian countries, whereas it is −0.26 for the EU27 countries. This indicates that the Asian countries have generally been able to combine increasing GVC job opportunities with a rise in real income, whereas the European countries have not.
Our results indicate that the GVC income and GVC worker patterns in Asian countries present a different picture compared with those of the European countries. In particular, the positive correlation between increasing GVC job opportunities and rising real incomes in Asia is notable. An important task for policymakers as well as academic researchers is to identify the sources of this positive correlation and to investigate which policies can help sustain this virtuous cycle. 
